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The rapid institutional changes taking place today, including the emergence and global spread of 
new institutions bring to the fore the question of how new institutions develop. From the 1990s 
onwards, a new technical term has begun to spread in the literature: institutional 
entrepreneurship, reflecting the revaluation of people’s activity in institutional change. The aim 
of the paper is to answer the questions regarding this kind of entrepreneurship. How does 
institutional entrepreneurship emerge, how can we interpret and define this phenomenon? What 
kind of driving forces are behind it? How does it work in the real economy? The novelty of the 
paper is in addressing institutional entrepreneurship as the result of a special ability and activity 
of actors to combine different, already known elements for building up new institutions. The 
study introduces the characteristics of institutional entrepreneurship, using the example of the 
sharing economy, by contrasting sharing as an alternative to conventional market solutions. The 
paper also demonstrates how the institutional entrepreneurship of sharing changes its socio-
economic environment, from mobilization of unused resources through perception of ownership 
to the increase of the growth potential of the economy.  
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1.Introduction  
The objective of the present study is to show institutional entrepreneurship from a 
nonconventional perspective as creating innovative connections between, or new combinations of 
existing institutions. Shane and Venkataraman (2000: 218) define entrepreneurship as such by 
                                                 
1 This paper is an extended version of the presentation given at the conference held on the occasion of Balázs 
Hámori’s 70th birthday by the Department of Comparative and Institutional Economics of Corvinus University 
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answering the questions: “why, when, and how opportunities for the creation of goods and 
services come into existence; why, when, and how some people and not others discover and 
exploit these opportunities, and why, when, and how different modes of action are used to 
exploit entrepreneurial opportunities”. In this paper we raise similar questions, with regard to a 
special kind of entrepreneurship. How does institutional entrepreneurship emerge? What drives 
this type of entrepreneurship? How does it work in practice? What impact does it have on its 
socio-economic environment?   
Institutional entrepreneurship can be defined as “the purposive action of individuals and 
organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence – Suddaby, 
2006: 215) Here we leave out of consideration the formal institutions (law, regulations, etc.) 
created by the conscious acts of governmental players or other state actors. We focus in this 
paper on institutional entrepreneurship as a purposeful act of market players or other non-state 
actors. Though the number of articles and books devoted to the issue has been rapidly 
increasing, researchers are far from reaching a consensus about the basic concepts and 
interpretation of the phenomenon. Thus it is quite opportune to clarify some of the disputable 
concepts or problems in our study. In response to the issue of institutional entrepreneurship, 
discussed in the literature, we approach the phenomenon from a special angle. The novelty of the 
paper is that it treats institutional entrepreneurship as a result of a special ability and activity of 
actors to combine already existing resources and institutional elements for building up new 
institutions. The study describes the characteristics of institutional entrepreneurship, using the 
example of the sharing economy, by contrasting them as alternatives to current conventional 
market institutions.2  
 
2. Institutional entrepreneurship, institutional entrepreneurs.  
Before we come to the issue, we should define the essence of some basic notions occurring in 
the paper: namely institution and entrepreneurship, both having different understandings and 
                                                 
2  Conventional market institutions mean, in this context, the different kinds of profit-oriented capitalist 
enterprises, from multinational companies to SMEs. 
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definitions in the literature. In this paper we basically apply the Northian definition of 
institutions: “Institutions are the rule of the gamein a society, or more formally humanly devised 
constraints, that shape human interactions. In consequence, they structure incentives in human 
exchange whether political, social, or economic” (North 1990: 3). The other crucial notion in our 
work is the entrepreneur. We use the concept of entrepreneur or entrepreneurship in a 
Schumpeterian sense: “to Schumpeter the entrepreneur is the innovator who implements change 
within market through the carrying out of new combinations” (Dean 2016: 28). Similarly to 
entrepreneurship in general, the combination of different elements and resources constitutes the 
core of institutional entrepreneurship too. The Schumpeterian definition of entrepreneur is 
especially adequate for the subject of our paper, because the combination of the existing 
elements in an innovative way plays an essential role in institutional entrepreneurship too.   
  
Institutional economics had, for a long time, focused mainly on the analysis of a stable 
institutional framework, and on the actors’ adaptation to this framework. It presented economic 
players as embedded in the institutional network who consider this framework as given. “In sum, 
the institutional literature, whether it focuses on economics, sociology or cognition, has largely 
focused on explaining the stability and persistence of institutions as well as isomorphic change 
in fields. More recently, however, there has been interest in how non-isomorphic change can be 
explained using an institutional lens” (Garud et al. 2007: 959). There were also scholars who 
addressed the problem in a dynamic way, analyzing and explaining the transformation of 
institutions. First of all, the works of Hayek (1988), North (1990) and Nelson (2005) should be 
mentioned in this context.3  But while explaining the institutional changes, they left in the 
shadow or even denied the active role and conscious efforts of actors in institutional evolution. 
Hayek ignored the role of conscious and purposeful human actions and intentions in the 
institutional changes or in the evolving complexity of institutions, which he termed 
“spontaneous order.”  
To understand our civilisation, one must appreciate that the extended order resulted not from human design 
or intention but spontaneously: it arose from unintentionally conforming to certain traditional and largely 
                                                 
3 There are of course numerous other explanations (see Brousseau et al. 2011; Kingston – Cabarello 2009), but 
the discussion on them would go beyond the limits of our paper.   
  
  
4  
moral practices, many of which men tend to dislike, whose significance they usually fail to understand, 
whose validity they cannot prove, and which have nonetheless fairly rapidly spread by means of an 
evolutionary selection – the comparative increase of population and wealth – of those groups that happened 
to follow them. (Hayek 1988: 6)  
North (1990) made a distinction between the formal and informal rules regarding their role in 
institutional changes. According to him, informal rules are shaped in an evolutionary process, 
and play a key role in institutional change, because they have transformed slowly and cannot be 
changed deliberately. Similarily to Hayek, Nelson (2005) also saw institutional changes as a 
result of evolutionary forces, but he considered physical technology as the main driver of 
institutional transformation. Oliver Williamson (1975; 1985) treated the institutional framework 
as exogenous, underlining the role of transaction and transformation costs in the development of 
new institutional forms. The common characteristic of the above explanations of institutional 
change is that they neglected the role of conscious human activity in creating new institutions or 
in their evolution. “Whereas early institutional studies (Selznick 1949; 1957) did account for 
actors’ agency, subsequent institutional studies tended to overlook the role of actors in 
institutional change. According to these latter studies, institutional change was caused by 
exogenous shocks that challenged existing institutions in a field of activity” (Leca et al. 2008: 3). 
“The notion of institutional entrepreneurship emerged as a possible new research avenue to 
provide endogenous explanations for institutional change” (Leca et al. 2008: 3). In the past few 
decades, researchers, especially those primarily interested in the theory of the firm and 
organizational studies, started to shift the focus and look at the other side of the coin when 
analyzing institutions. “The hallmark of institutional entrepreneurship is associated with the 
importance, given to the actors choices, perception, and actions in the context of change” (Drori 
– Landau 2011: 21). At the same time, the passivity of actors has been resolved in the analyses, 
focusing on the generators of change. “Institutional entrepreneurship tends to elevate the hyper-
muscular, heroic efforts of entrepreneurial actors, who overthrow established institutions; it 
offers a counterpoint to alternative conceptualization of actors as ‘passive dopesʼ, who are 
overwhelmed and constrained by and thus succumb to, institutional forces without hope of 
overthrowing or even changing them” (Raffaely – Glynn 2015: 408). The new approach puts the 
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stress on actors’ activism, and it has become known as agency theory4 in economic literature of 
the late 1980s (DiMaggio 1988). 
It is not by coincidence that institutional entrepreneurship and institutional entrepreneurs have 
come to the focus in the past few decades. In a knowledge-based economy, activity and its 
subject is in general valued more than conformity and the passive acceptance of existing 
frameworks, just as much in practice as in theoretical research. Seeing the growing research 
interest in agency theory, and the rapidly increasing literature5 on institutional entrepreneurship, 
many scholars consider this branch of institutionalism the most promising line for developments 
of institutional theory (see e.g. Greenwood et al. 2002; Tracey et al. 2011; Laksman 2015; Hu et 
al. 2016). But we also share the opinion of Laksman: “despite advances in the institutional 
entrepreneurship literature (e.g., DiMaggio 1988), our understanding of the dynamics of 
institutional change is in its infancy.” (Laksman 2015: 160) This explains the lack of consensus 
in definition and the absence of a common conceptual framework of institutional 
entrepreneurship, and opens a broad space for further researches in this direction.   
 
3. Institutional entrepreneurship: the relevance of the problem in the recent 
era  
In the introduction we described institutional entrepreneurship as “the purposive action of 
individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” 
(Lawrence – Suddaby 2006: 215). As to the concept of institutional entrepreneurship, we 
consider it necessary to enrich the generally accepted definition of the term. According to our 
extended definition, institutional entrepreneurship may be characterised as the purposive action 
of individuals or groups operating in (or outside the scope of) market and organisations, which 
action is aimed at the establishment of new institutions (substantial restructuring, and 
abolishment of old institutions, in other words, institutional innovation). “Institutional 
                                                 
4 On agency theory, see Leca et al. (2008).  
5  Between 1998 and 2017, the EBSCO database contained altogether 350 records regarding institutional 
entrepreneurship. Whilst in the first decade of the above mentioned period (between 1998 and 2007) the records 
amounted only to 55, in the last decade, they were already 295. Google yielded 60,600 hits on this entry.   
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entrepreneurship is not localised, but rather it takes place on a large scale” (Raffaely – Glynn 
2015). It is an important element of the definition that institutional entrepreneurs “create a whole 
new system of meaning that ties the functioning of disparate sets of institutions together” (Garud 
et al. 2002: 196). 
Institutional changes are closely intertwined with organizational changes. Although institutional 
entrepreneurs in most of the cases disrupt or change the existing organizational framework, this 
kind of entrepreneurship is not confined to creating new types of organization. It is a much more 
comprehensive notion. As Bockhaven et al. (2005: 175): put it: “Institutional entrepreneurship 
targets entire fields, the overall networks, cultural-cognitive systems, organizational archetypes, 
and collective action repertoires […]”. 6  The just-in-time method or teamwork are simple 
organizational innovations, but these do not meet the criteria of institutional entrepreneurship, 
they do not “target entire fields, the overall networks, cultural-cognitive systems, organizational 
archetypes, and collective action repertoires”. Institutional entrepreneurship is a starting point 
for major socio-economic changes that transform the whole industry or even the world.   
In an historic era when we are witnessing genuine institutional explosions, the relevance of 
research focusing on institutional entrepreneurs does not need to be vindicated. “We theorize 
that these moments of transition, from one historical period to the next, are times when 
institutional stability and isomorphism may be somewhat weakened and institutional innovations 
may play a greater role” (Raffaely – Glynn 2015: 411). The phenomenon of institutional 
proliferation, i.e. fast spread of novel institutional models to other sectors, areas, or countries, 
has also become a general tendency. E-markets for example exist in almost every country. E-
Bay, the archetype of the e-market, shows clearly the crucial role of the institutional 
entrepreneur: the name of the initiator, Pierre Omidyar, is well-known. Its Hungarian equivalent 
called Vatera, founded in 2000, is also a successful enterprise, but we can find e-Bay’s local 
counterparts also in less developed countries, such as, for example, the Ethiopian e-market called 
Ethiopian Artisan, dealing artisanal products.   
                                                 
6 In this regard the authors refer to the article of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and the book of Scott (2008).  
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Naturally, institutional entrepreneurships were founded in every era. The classic example for this 
is the founding of the Dutch East India Company in 1602. The Dutch East India Company was 
the first entrepreneurship to issue stock, contributing to the birth of the stock exchange, a 
substantial institution of capitalism till the present day, which changed radically the nature of 
capitalism. So, the founders of the Dutch East India Company, who played an active role in 
these major changes, may be considered institutional entrepreneurs, just like the establishers of 
conglomerates in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s and 1970s novel market players in America 
organized many small companies with relatively small market shares and very diverse company 
profiles into huge enterprises, which also meant the creation of conglomerate, an organization 
that had not existed before. “Often little conglomerates would take over giant, cash rich 
companies, many times their own size, using in the end the cash of the company taken over to 
pay for the acquisition. Thirty-year-old whiz kids pyramided thousands of dollars into tens of 
millions almost overnight” – wrote Samuelson in his textbook Economics (1976: 528). “Often 
those seeking take-overs represented outsiders self-made newly arrived chaps, who hadn’t 
belonged to Yale’s Skull and Bones or been vetted by the existing business establishment” 
(Samuelson 1976: 529) This innovation made it possible for outsiders lacking substantial 
financial means to engage in a competition with powerful monopolies and oligopolies, thus 
shaking up frozen ownership structures. These founders of conglomerates may legitimately be 
considered institutional entrepreneurs, since they did not fit into the existing business and 
institutional order, but rather went around it through establishing a novel institution.   
Nowadays, however, new institutions appear in vast numbers and spread fast around the globe. 
This is the reason why the analysis of institutional entrepreneurship has become a popular line of 
research. The relevance of the topic of institutional entrepreneurship in present day Hungary is 
further increased by the currently started fundamental institutional restructuring of the country, 
with the establishment of several new institutions. The institutional changes go on not only in the 
governmental sphere, but also in the market. However, radical institutional restructuring may be 
detected elsewhere, too (ee may refer here to changes taking place in the European Union 
following Brexit). 
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There are many different forms of institutional entrepreneurship, but they show some common 
characteristics too. Similarly to a traditional entrepreneur, an institutional entrepreneur also faces 
constraints in the form of a variety of institutional barriers. A typical common type of such 
barriers is entry barriers, due to the monopolization of the targeted industry or constraints 
created artificially by the government. Because of the strength and power of incumbents, there is 
no other way to overcome these barriers, only by disrupting7 the given institutional frameworks 
and creating new ones. New technologies often do not fit traditional institutional frameworks, 
and this induces people who are interested in new technologies, and want to turn them into a 
business success to disrupt the persistent institutional frameworks. But the incumbents often 
resist institutional changes. Insistence on traditional operational modes by incumbents is 
explained not only by their natural conservativism, but also by the phenomenon of sunk costs. 
Nevertheless, in some cases the incumbents do not notice the appearance of dangerous 
competitors, and by the time they realize the danger, the institutional entrepreneurs have 
acquired a considerable market share, starting to even force them out of the market. As 
mentioned earlier, this was typically observable for example in the case of conglomerates.  
Both the entrepreneur and the institutional entrepreneur generate externalities for others, but in 
the first case the externalities come from a technology, a product, or a business model, whilst in 
case of institutional entrepreneurs the externality is embodied in a new, more efficient 
institution, which gives the opportunity for the society to utilize inactive or under-used resources 
(Garud et al. 2007). This statement was proved by the historic examples too. The Dutch East 
India Company, for example, put in motion small capitals, which separately were unable to 
finance big projects of conquering Asia, ensuring the dominance of the highly profitable long-
distance trade. Institutional entrepreneurship dynamizes a considerable part of the economy and 
has a positive effect on the growth potential of the industry, a country or even the world 
economy. Institutional entrepreneurship improves the general efficiency of the economy by 
crowding out the old, obsolete institutions, which hinder developments. As a consequence it 
clears the way before technological and other innovations. Most of the novel institutions created 
                                                 
7  The phenomenon of disruption was thoroughly analyzed in the context of innovation by Christiansen 
(1997/2013) in his seminal work.  
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by institutional entrepreneurs decrease the transaction costs and ensure greater flexibility in 
business transactions. These are the biggest trumps in the competition with their counterparts.   
  
The novel institutions created by institutional entrepreneurs often change the perception of 
ownership, too. This was also clearly proved by the case of the conglomerates, because the 
founders of conglomerates built whole company empires in lack of own property or investment 
capital. The above characteristics of institutional entrepreneurship may constitute enough 
reasons for us to turn to observing the character of institutional entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurs, using the example of typical institutional entrepreneurship: the sharing economy. 
We are convinced that the case of a real institutional entrepreneurship can better enlighten the 
nature of the phenomenon than an abstract explication of the issue.   
  
4. The method of the study  
The paper uses qualitative methods. As we do not have extensive and reliable8 databases of 
different kinds of institutional entrepreneurship, among them of sharing, which would allow us 
to statistically capture the phenomena discussed in the paper, no other methodology but 
qualitative analysis can come into play. Partial studies, statistical analyses taken out of context, 
of course exist, however, the results are far from being apt for generalization.   
 
Looking at the sharing based economy we focus on one relationship: we describe and analyze 
the new phenomenon as a combination of old and new elements in different senses. Thus, we 
return to the Schumpeterian tradition in this sense. An important part of the study is the 
theoretical analysis and comparison.  We contrast sharing as alternatives to current conventional 
market institutions.   
  
5. The institutional entrepreneurship of sharing  
One of the most spectacular and robust forms of institutional entrepreneurship in the last one or 
two decades is sharing. Institutional entrepreneurs play a decisive role in the phenomenon of 
                                                 
8 In some cases the fact that they originate from data providers who themselves have an interest in the results 
shown by the statistics, also reduces the value of these statistics.  
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sharing for several reasons. Sharing is a radically novel institution, whose initiators may be 
easily identified. In addition to this, sharing definitely meets the criteria of institutional 
entrepreneurship as described in Section 3: it has spread fast, has had a deep and wide impact, 
and has had a global dimension from the beginning. Showing disruptive signs, it threatens 
several traditional industrial branches from transportation to the catering and hotel industry to 
flat rentals.   
  
5.1. Interpretation of sharing and its two basic forms    
Sharing can be defined as “peer-to-peer based activity of obtaining, giving, or sharing the 
access to goods and services, coordinated through community-based online services.” (Hamari 
et al. 2016: 2047) The institution of sharing is an umbrella concept, incorporating different 
versions of the principle of sharing – from communities operating on purely community based 
principles, where participants only share the costs of the usage of their shared goods.  
The sharing economy encompasses a wide range of initiatives from marginal twist to business as usual 
(BAU) to radical alternatives. We use the term connected consumption to describe the initiatives in the 
sharing economy from the consumer side. Nostalgia about an earlier era when people knew their 
neighbors and could rely on them, permeates the sharing economy. Connected refers to both the digital 
and the social aspects of these practices. Meanwhile, from the provider’s side, these innovations open up 
a variety ways to earn income and/or increase access to goods and services. (Dubois et al. 2014: 51)  
Confusingly, numerous phenomena and concepts closely related to sharing appear in the 
literature, whose definition is not yet agreed on by the researchers. To mention just one example, 
we may come across the term “collaborative consumption”, or, in other words, “connected 
consumption”, besides sharing. Applying this terminology, researchers mean to shift the focus 
from service providers to those using the services when looking at the phenomenon of sharing. 
Yet others refer to this as pure sharing, void of any business interest, and define it as follows: 
connected consumption, where participants share goods mostly eliminating money or any 
business interest, constitutes a classical community based solution (Botsman – Rogers 2011). 
Favor banks operate on this principle, the most well-known Hungarian example being 
“OurStreet” (Miutcánk). The terms “peer to peer economy”, “pay as you use economy” or 
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“access economy” are also used; there are subtle differences as to their meaning, but these terms 
are also sometimes used to refer to somewhat different versions of sharing.9 
 
In our paper we make a definite distinction between the two basic forms of sharing, the “pure 
sharing”, that works without any profit or business considerations, and the mixed version of 
sharing, which uses the potential of mass (community), but driven by business interest from the 
intermediary’s side. Some authors definitely separate these two forms from one another, and the 
latter form, namely the mixed version (like Uber or Airbnb) organized by intermediaries they do 
not consider as sharing. “When ‘sharingʼ is market-mediated — when a company is an 
intermediary between consumers who don’t know each other -- it is no longer sharing at all. 
Rather, consumers are paying to access someone else’s goods or services for a particular period 
of time. It is an economic exchange, and consumers are after utilitarian, rather than social, 
value…. isn’t really a ‘sharingʼ economy at all; it’s an access economy.” (Eckhardt – Bardh 
2015: 3, 2) We focus in the paper mainly on this latter, mixed version of sharing.  
 
Nevertheless, there are instances when a situation cannot be efficiently solved, either by the 
market or by the state – in these cases pure sharing solutions constitute the best alternative. For 
example, opening and maintaining day care establishments for infants in small villages may not 
be profitable, nor does the state necessarily have sufficient resources or willingness to do it. In these 
cases the community of the parents involved may join forces and come up with a solution. Building 
on mutual trust, they use the resources of the local community looking after each others’ children. 
In part, pure collective forms of the sharing economy offer a solution for such and similar 
problems, as originally analysed by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom (1977). Ostrom conceptualised 
this as a “common pool resources problem”, 10 and, although this is a phenomenon different from 
pure sharing in many respects, the two do have characteristics in common. In the case of the 
infants nursery organized by a local community – as opposed the common pool resources – the 
                                                 
9 However, the establishment of a sharing taxonomy exceeds the scope of this paper.  
10 Ostrom and her co-workers added “a very important fourth type of good – common-pool resources – that 
shares the attribute of subtractability with private goods and difficulty of exclusion with public goods” (Ostrom 
– Ostrom 1977). “Forests, water systems, fisheries, and the global atmosphere are all common-pool resources of 
immense importance for the survival of humans on this earth” (Ostrom 2009: 412) . 
  
  
12  
exclusion from the service is a real option Nevertheless, this sharing solution is reflected 
perfectly by Ostrom’s statements: “Extensive empirical research documents the diversity of 
settings in which individuals solve common-pool resource problems on their own, when these 
solutions are sustainable over long periods of time, and how larger institutional arrangements 
enhance or detract from the capabilities of individuals at smaller scales to solve problems 
efficiently and sustainably.” (Ostrom 2009: 435). 
  
At the time of its emergence people started to hype sharing, since they regarded it as a 
community alternative to capitalist solutions, the overture of a new social system. As Morgan 
and Kuch (2015: 557) put it: “The notion of a sharing economy, as the phrase itself suggests, has 
connotations that are more nurturing and generative than extractive, as reflected in the subtitle of 
Janelle Orsi’s pioneering book on Practising Law in the Sharing Economy: ‘helping people build 
cooperatives, social enterprise, and local sustainable economies.’” Jeremy Rifkin (2014) – 
analyzing the sharing economy – envisioned a world beyond markets, where we would live in an 
increasingly interdependent global Collaborative Commons. Similarly was the essence of the 
sharing formulated by Gibson-Graham (2003: 5), describing it as “a need to modify ourselves, to 
become different, and more specifically [to develop] the capacity to enact a new relation to the 
economy.” We do not agree with the above standpoints. But, we also refuse the other extreme, 
according to which there is no novelty in sharing, it should be considered “business as usual”. 
There are such opinions that sharing should be considered merely as a digitalized marketplace 
that technically makes the meeting of supply and demand easier. Indeed, meeting supply and 
demand is not an element that emerged within the sharing economy, on the contrary, the 
existence of the institution of exchange dates back to prehistoric times. Occasional exchanges 
made between tribes, however, can be paralleled neither with the agora in Athens nor with 
today’s global markets, despite the fact that in all of the above the meeting of supply and 
demand was realised. However, they do differ in numerous other aspects, as we will illustrate in 
Table 2 when comparing today’s conventional capitalist entrepreneurship and sharing economy. 
We see mixed sharing, discussed in this paper as a combination of collaborative common and 
conventional business solutions.   
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5.2. Active role of institutional entrepreneurs in inventing and diffusion of sharing   
A typical example for the above mixed sharing is Uber, an alternative to the conventional market 
solution of a taxi. The sharing cases underpin the role of institutional entrepreneurs in initiating 
of new institutions, as we have underlined it in Section 2. We can identify for example the 
initiator of the sharing service of Uber:   
In 2008 Travis Kalanick and Garrett Camp, like old pals, were complaining… how hard to find a cab 
when they are packed with luggage under the rain and no taxi seems to pass. They were about ways to 
solve the issue of finding cars at the right place, on the right time… Garrett took the lead and 
engineering a mobile app for the iPhone that would revolutionize the very idea of getting around. Travis 
joined the ride to work with him on what would later be known as Uber. Fast forward to January 2010 
and Uber was already rolling a couple of black cars in the city of New York (Belarbi n.d.).  
Uber may also be regarded as an example of how institutional entrepreneurship may shake up 
rigid market structures, in this case that of passenger transportation. The taxi market is 
characterised by rigidity in most countries. Kalanick and Camp did not only carry out an 
organisational reform but they managed to break the conventional institutional framework that 
used to make the taxi market difficult to enter for outsiders. With their institutional 
entrepreneurship they went around the entrance barriers/requirements, just like the “inventors” 
of conglomerates four decades earlier. Rather than entering the field of the incumbents, and thus 
starting a hopeless battle, the inventors of Uber decided to establish a new battlefield out of the 
control of the incumbents.  
Not only organizers but also users of institutional entrepreneurship belong characteristically to 
younger generations. This, however, also foreshadows the future, according to the results of a 
research carried out by Bloomberg. The study shows the representation of age groups related to 
the total workforce of the United States, the ratio of the given age group in total workforce 
indicated in blue, while the ratio of the age group working in the sharing economy indicated in 
orange. As seen in Figure 1, the representation of the age group 65+ working in sharing 
economy amounts to only 1-2 percent of the total of those working in the sharing sector, while 
the ratio of those between 18-24 years of age amounts to 39 percent, despite the fact that this 
latter age group represents only 12 percent of the total workforce of the United States.   
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Figure 1. Sharing economy workers by age group in the US (2015) 
 
Source: 2015 Economy Workforce Report.  
 
5.3. The technological background: the combination of known technologies  
The institution of sharing also existed earlier, but it was not widely known. The digital 
revolution and the spread of info-communication technologies did not only make sharing much 
more popular and widespread but also modified its character, making it possible to target a 
considerably greater community. It need not be emphasized that present day solutions 
classifiable as belonging to the so called sharing economy could not have emerged without the 
internet and development of mobile communication technology (smart phones, applications, 
internet platforms, etc.). We tend to forget that significant institutional entrepreneurships in the 
past11 did also rely to a great extent on infocommunication technologies of the given era.  
Information technology occupies a central role in the forms of sharing in the 21st century. The 
services available are not only economical, but also comfortable, suited to personal needs (mass 
customization), which, in case of Uber and service providers of a similar profile, are created with 
                                                 
11 For example, in 1880, the German social security system, an institutional entrepreneurship of national scale 
could not have come into existence in the absence of information technology developments of the age. In order 
to introduce social security, bureaucracy had to keep track of citizens, complex data had to be collected and 
stored (typewriter, cheap paper, development of the German postal service, professional German bureaucracy – 
Shiller 2005). 
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the help of mobile apps and coordinating internet platforms. The current variations of sharing 
economy may be defined as combinations in the technological sense too, the unification of 
physical goods (car, room, tools, etc.) and ICT technology. One is useless without the other. We 
are talking about a new combination, every element of which existed before; it is only their 
innovative combination that can be regarded as revolutionary.  
Printing is often cited as a classical example for this phenomenon. “Johannes Gutenberg, the 
creator of printing press, utilized movable types, combined two previously unconnected items – 
the winepress and the coin pouch – to create an unprecedented invention that would make 
printed books for millions of people” (Noble Topf 2014: 85). It is not difficult to recognize that 
the development of capitalism may not have taken place without Gutenberg’s institutional 
entrepreneurship.  
The pace of work of the monks drawing letters with scrutiny into codices could have never been suitable 
either for the edition of volumes of technological descriptions, or for the supply of textbooks for mass 
vocational training, or the mass production of newspapers. Without the latter, modern industrial socio-
political framework could not have come into existence. Without pamphlets and newspapers reaching 
broad masses (of by the time literate people) industrial capital could never have overcome the static rule 
of landlords. Similarly, a couple of hundred years later, on the turn of the 20th century transnational 
companies could not have come about without the operation of the telephone or the telegraph (Szabó – 
Hámori 2006: 46). 
The far-reaching effect of Gutenberg’s institutional entrepreneurship clearly shows the 
difference between simple technological innovation and institutional entrepreneurship.  
 
5.4. Sharing as a combination in different senses  
As we pointed out in the paper, we handle the institutional entrepreneurship of sharing as a 
combination of existing elements in many different senses. One can meet in the literature other 
approaches, that also put the stress on the combinative character of sharing, but they interpret it 
as one side of the combination, as the basis of a future new society, which has not yet been 
combined with the capitalist market economy. Jeremy Rifkin (2014) sees the economy of our 
days as a combination of the business world and collaborative economy of sharing. He has 
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predicted that the collaborative economy incrementally may crowd out the capitalist market 
economy. The people will share tangible and intangible goods on the Internet. In such a world, 
ownership and “market value” will be replaced by “sharable value” in the Collaborative 
Commons. We provide a totally different meaning for combination in the context of sharing. In 
our interpretation, sharing itself (at least some specific kinds of sharing) is a combination. Take, 
for example, Uber and Airbnb. The institutional entrepreneurship of sharing may be conceived 
as the combination of the common use or collaborative consumption of goods and business 
intermediaries, connecting supply and demand. In other words, it is the combination of the 
novel, shared use of goods and traditional capitalist profit-oriented services.   
The institutional entrepreneurship of sharing is a complex phenomenon, combining more 
different institutions or solutions already known. The institution of mass customization (Szabó – 
Kocsis 2002), for example, exists independently from sharing, but it is also a building block for 
this type of entrepreneurship. The services of Uber or Airbnb show the characteristics of 
massification, but at the same time they adjust to the individual unique needs of every single 
customer. The wide spread of customization and personalization may also be traced back to the 
appearance of ICT technology. The demand for uniform mass services has been decreasing, 
while people are attracted by the great variety of services available. Through the amazing variety 
of their supply, global service providers of sharing economy are able to provide much bigger 
space for personalization than their traditional counterparts.   
The shift towards dematerialization in many segments of the economy is one of the most robust 
trends of the last decades, and this trend is present also in sharing. People’s willingness to 
temporarily access goods, to have the function instead of having the goods, the “access over 
property” principle is an inbuilt element of sharing. It is not by accident that functions rather 
than material products are in the focus of sharing attempts. People need a hole in the wall rather 
than a drilling machine, mobility rather than a car, accommodation rather than a weekend 
house. This effort is in line with the knowledge economy currently becoming more and more 
dematerialized. Nevertheless, market players operating in the field of production of goods still 
want to sell cars and do artificially incorporate into their household appliances parts that make 
the appliances obsolete ten years later, so that the manufacturer can sell the same products to the 
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same consumers again. This is how a market niche appeared for those institutional entrepreneurs 
who offer selling functions rather than goods to consumers. Table 1 summarizes the different 
types of combinations which determine the institutional entrepreneurship of sharing.   
 
Table 1. Institutional entrepreneurship (sharing) as a combination of business and collaborative 
solutions* 
Type of combination  Example of Uber and Airbnb  
Built on the combination of different 
technologies or goods already known 
Technological combination of mobile application, internet 
platform (intangible goods) and different types of tangible 
goods (car or accommodation) 
Combination of new types of actors, and 
conventional market players   
The combination of the “mass” (community), sharing their 
resources and profit oriented intermediary company  
Combination of several institutions already 
known elsewhere   
Mass customization of the service for individual consumers, 
buying functions instead of goods, electronic flee market, etc.   
Combination of new types of atypical 
employment and reliability of service  
Combination of flexible, fragmented, individual employment 
possibilities for service providers and fixed, safe service, 
organized by a profit-oriented company  
Combination of different driving forces, which 
direct consumer demand towards the sharing 
entrepreneurships  
Unsatisfactory services of conventional monopolist service 
providers and the budgetary constraints of consumers  
Source: compiled by the author  
 
6. The socio-economic effects of sharing   
6.1. Mobilization of resources and decreasing amount of waste: external effects of 
sharing   
As mentioned in Section 3, institutional entrepreneurship in most cases mobilizes unutilized or 
underutilized resources (DiMaggio 1988). The institutional entrepreneurship of sharing makes 
the emergence of such transactions possible that could never have been realized in the traditional 
institutional framework. “On average, the capacity utilization rate is 30 percent higher for UberX 
drivers than taxi drivers when measured by time, and 50 percent higher when measured by 
miles.” (Cramer – Krueger 2016: 177). 
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Sharing is aimed at services and goods that would otherwise be unaffordable for the average 
consumer. “The practical interest [for sharing] has been driven by a combination, on the one 
hand, of less than satisfactory experience with managerial and contractualist nostrums for 
service delivery and, on the other hand, of increasing budgetary stringency (OECD 2011) as it 
was generally summarized as how to govern the commons when both government and private 
markets fail” (Afford 2014: 300). The budgetary problems of consumers have been more severe 
from 2007 as a consequence of the world economic crisis. A similar effect is achieved by the 
increasing income inequalities in most countries of the world on the diffusion of cost-saving 
sharing.   
An apt example for resource mobilization is Oszkar Telekocsi, a community-based alternative to 
taxi services, founded in Hungary. Not everyone can afford daily mobility using their own 
personally owned vehicle, moreover, many of those who do own a car prefer to share its 
maintenance and fuel costs with others, if they belong to a lower income group. The welfare 
enhancing effects of sharing may therefore hardly be overestimated. The comment of a member 
of the Hungarian Oszkar carpooling community is a typical example for this. A grandmother 
living in the countryside could only visit her grandchild once a month due to high travel 
expenses, but thanks to Oszkar ridesharing they may now see each other much more often.  
However, not only the material resources are mobilized by sharing, but also the human resources 
as we experience in case of such services as Airbnb or Uber.  
In developed capitalist economies, but often also in less developed ones, an unbelievable amount 
of waste is created that remains unconsumed. Inconceivable amounts of materials and energy, 
i.e. natural resources are used in order to produce unutilized goods, the environmental impact of 
which is more than worrisome. The Hungarian ridesharing service Oszkar continuously indicates 
on its homepage the reduction in carbon dioxide emission due to their service offered – which on 
the 10 August 2016 amounted to 807 179 167kg, a practice similarly applied by such 
emblematic figures of sharing economy as Uber or Airbnb (see Figure 2). But at the same time, 
an opposite effect is created. An increase in consumption of sharing services as a result of their 
affordability (compared to their traditional counterparts) results in creating a greater 
environmental burden, regarding both transportation and recreation. Uber, for example, 
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increases the number of traffic jams in cities where it is available. Exchanging used clothing, 
sharing tools, or bicycles constitute, on the other hand, definitely “green” sharing solutions.   
 
Figure 2. Airbnb’s estimates on sustainability measures 
 
Source: http://blog.airbnb.com/environmental-impacts-of-home-sharing/  
 
6. 2. Increasing economies of scale and scope  
Sharing is spreading quickly in various market segments – from money loans (Zopa, in the 
United Kingdom has 57,000 members), to lending used appliances (Open Shed in Australia), or 
to renting homes (Airbnb). As can be seen from the data below, a further advantage of sharing as 
opposed to traditional equivalents is that it may become a network of an almost limitless size, 
involving masses in the network of participants sharing their goods.   
Airbnb may boast with 60 million users. It has 640 thousand hosts, 2 million listings in 57 
thousand cities, 192 countries, and the service is used daily by an average of 500 thousand 
people (data from first half of 2016, see Smith 2017a). Even the largest international hotel chains 
or cab companies cannot come near these dimensions. “Airbnb’s platform has scaled quickly in 
terms of users and numbers of transactions. A strong network effect has influenced the constant 
growth of hosts and guests. Through its platform, Airbnb has not just created new user behaviors 
but has changed the supply side of the hotel industry as well” (Henten – Windekilde 2016: 9). In 
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comparison, Uber has 8 million users, 160 thousand drivers providing services, and have 
completed 2 billion rides in total so far, with the average daily use amounting to 1 million rides. 
Uber operates in 400 cities and 70 countries (Smith 2017b). 
Similarly to other institutional entrepreneurships – from the Dutch East India Company to 
conglomerates – institutional entrepreneurship of sharing also extends the boundaries of 
transactions, both in time12 and space. At the same time, it decreases the per-unit production and 
transaction costs. (Horton – Zeckhauser 2016) This latter impact is much stronger in case of 21st 
century institutional entrepreneurship than it was earlier. “Without the digital platforms, the 
transaction costs of searching, contacting, contracting, etc. would generally be much too high for 
such commercial markets to develop.” (Henten – Windekilde 2016: 2) The decreasing costs 
enable to form a pricing strategy (in most cases dynamic pricing) which is advantageous for the 
consumers.    
 
A further advantage of sharing in comparison with traditional service providers is that while 
these latter usually offer a couple of variants of their service – a few dozen, as a maximum –, 
services operating on a sharing basis not only have an extended network, but, consequently, they 
can also offer a much greater variety of services. As a result, personal needs may be satisfied 
more adequately by services based on sharing. Friedman (2013) underpins this statement by the 
following facts (cited Brian Cheskyt, the co-founder of Airbnb):  
“We have over 600 castles,” he begins. “We have dozens of yurts, caves, tepees with TVs in them, 
water towers, motor homes, private islands, glass houses, lighthouses, igloos with Wi-Fi; we have a 
home that Jim Morrison used to live in; we have treehouses — hundreds of treehouses — which are the 
most profitable listings on our Web site per square footage. The treehouse in Lincoln, Vt., is more 
valuable than the main house. We have treehouses in Vermont that have had six-month waiting lists. 
People plan their vacation now around treehouse availability! In 2011, Prince Hans-Adam II offered his 
entire principality of Liechtenstein for rent on Airbnb ($70,000 a night), ‘complete with customized 
street signs and temporary currencyʼ.” (Friedman 2013)   
The 21st century versions of tourism can less and less be based on the uniform mass services, 
people are more and more attracted by variety, ie. the source of income and profit growth is 
                                                 
12 In contrast to simple capitalist private companies, the shareholder companies survive their founders or their 
families, and the lifespan of the business is absolutely independent from the individuals’ life courses.  
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economies of scope (Szabó – Kocsis 2002), i.e. a combination of services offered for the masses 
and satisfaction of personal needs (masses, in some cases, may stand for the entire population of 
the Earth in principle, as in the case of Airbnb operating in 192 countries, which, as is illustrated 
by the above quotation, offers the satisfaction of exceptionally extreme personal needs, as well). 
 
6.3. Increasing flexibility  
As mentioned in Section 3, one of institutional entrepreneurship’s main trumps in competition is 
that they offer greater flexibility in comparison with its conventional equivalents. Typical 
sharing services not only match special consumer needs thanks to their great variety, but also 
because of their availability in time, as in case of Uber, for example. The number of service 
providers is low in case of traditional cabs in times of day that are inconvenient for the drivers, 
such as late night hours, and their numbers stay below real demand, resulting in some potential 
customers getting no service. At the same time, Uber offers services in these periods as well. As 
a result of dynamic pricing, flexible harmonization of supply and demand is possible. While 
traditional cabs operate usually on fixed prices, Uber prices go up in busy periods, to an extent 
that depends on actual demand, thus reducing demand. This way the service will only be used by 
those customers for whom it is so important that they are ready to pay the higher prices. In other 
words, the match of supply and preferences on the demand side is much better in time.    
Flexibility is apparent not only in the adjustment to consumer needs, but also in the personal 
schedule of those offering the service, i.e. the service may be regarded as a bilaterally flexible 
service. All aforementioned features of sharing may also be considered as combinations of some 
kind, as illustrated by Table 1.  
Increase of flexibility is enabled be the evaluation system, which is quite characteristic for this 
type of entrepreneurship. Evaluation may be mutual in some cases: not only does the passenger 
or the guest evaluate the service provider, but the service provider also evaluates the customer. 
The continuous feedback of customers gives the opportunity for the service provider to quickly 
adjust its activity to the needs of its customer. At the same time the evaluation system works as a 
reputation and trust building mechanism between the two parties of transaction.  
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 7. Sharing and its conventional market alternatives   
Similarly to other novel institutions, the sharing economy has a disruptive side to it – just like all 
new institutions; it might force out competitors offering traditional services from the market.   
7.1. Sharing in the light of traditional solutions  
As mentioned in Section 3, institutional entrepreneurs reflect on new technologies, take 
advantage of the competitive edges, and ride the new technological wave. In case of sharing, 
especially in its mixed version, Uber and Airbnb, the introduction and penetration of new ICT 
technologies is a key factor of success. Institutional innovations are made easier to carry out 
because traditional enterprises often fail to take advantage of these opportunities, they do not 
notice the appearance of dangerous competitors, and by the time they realize the danger, the new 
institution has acquired considerable market share, starting to even force them out of the market. 
This was typically observable in the case of Uber and Airbnb.   
The institution of sharing, especially the variants classifiable as collaborative consumption, are 
especially decreasing the environmental burden, and foster the spread of a green attitude. In 
comparison with sharing, its conventional market alternatives prove to be very expensive and 
wasteful. As we face the threat of global warming and other environmental catastrophes day by 
day, it is difficult to shrug our shoulders when witnessing the mindless waste of resources and 
not ponder on how this could be changed. This can also be considered as a comparative 
advantage of sharing against conventional market solutions. As it mentioned in Section 3, the 
chances for institutional entrepreneurships to appear are especially big in highly monopolized 
sectors. This could be observed in the 1970s when conglomerates appeared, but also on the 
contemporary cab market, where customers encounter rigid market structures. Naturally, 
incumbents offering traditional services tend to attempt to maintain the status quo, and fight the 
spread of the new institutions with all means available. They could, however, probably be more 
successful in retaining their market position by adopting a different behavior. Similarly to 
English landlords, who became capitalists in the course of the industrial revolution, traditional 
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service providers could undergo a transformation to adapt to the new environment. However, we 
can only see a few examples for this behavior.   
Competitors offering traditional alternative services often attempt to annul the competitive 
advantage of these novel institutions by forcing them out through legal regulation rather than by 
innovating their own services. This can be witnessed in several countries – among them in 
Hungary, in the case of Uber or Airbnb. Fortunately, there are some good examples too. For 
example, in connection with Uber, two taxi companies from Budapest – although failing to 
radically change their services – had an application for smart phones developed, adopting this 
element from Uber. This way, they managed to somewhat make their customers experience 
something similar to what Uber offers to the users, at least in this respect. In Table 2, the 
characteristics of sharing-based services are contrasted with those of conventional market-based 
services.  
A crucial problem of these types of sharing is facilitating trust among service providers and their 
clients. This problem is especially sharp in rental markets, given the “opportunity” renters have 
to misuse or destroy the flats or houses. Facilitating trust is not an easily solved problem, but in 
online markets different trust building mechanisms have been built in earlier, on which 
participants in sharing transactions can rely  
 
Table 2. Mixed sharing and its conventional market alternatives 
Name Current conventional 
market solutions 
Sharing Entrepreneurship 
Character of institution  Market based  Combination of community based and market 
based elements  
Technological background  Mainly traditional industrial 
technologies   
Application for mobile technologies, smart 
phones, internet platforms combined with 
traditional technologies (car, flat, etc.)  
Power-market position  In most cases hard power, dominant 
market players, significant market 
share (Hargadon – Douglas 2001)  
Soft power, new entrants, market niche  
(proximity to the client as a result of its size). 
Resources far outnumber those of even the 
biggest traditional service provider  
  
  
24  
Transaction + production cost  High  Low (due to the decreasing information cost, 
search costs and the higher capacity 
utilization   
Social loss   
(transactions failed)  
Big (Dahlman 1979). The less affluent 
clients are not able to access the service  
Can significantly decrease loss   
Fit of preferences, flexibility   Gaps, inflexible, additional costs, fixed 
prices   
Corrected fit, flexibility, dynamic pricing13  
Growth potential (increase in 
well-being)  
Small, or none at all  Big growth potential due to the international 
networks   
Regulation  State (overregulation)  Reputation based + state regulation  
Source: compiled by the author 
 
Last, but not least, self-regulation in the sharing economy appears to be inevitable. It is more and 
more difficult to apply state regulation over a global economy operating within frameworks of 
increasing complexity. Sluggishness of state bureaucracy is in striking contrast with hectic 
economic changes. It is only self-regulation that may resolve this contradiction. The sharing 
economy is based on trust building and self-regulation, which, however, cannot mean that state 
regulation is altogether unnecessary. The existence of sharing, however, might also be seen as a 
reaction to overregulation. The strategy of states that do not live with the possibility of 
overregulation and only intervene to the extent that is necessary in order to cut back “wildings” 
might be set as a good example (Estonia is a country that follows this practice in the region).  
  
Conclusions  
The paper aimed at answering some of the questions connected to the phenomenon of 
institutional entrepreneurship that, despite the rapidly growing body of literature focusing on the 
subject, had so far remained partly unanswered. We also tried to find arguments for the 
relevance and timely nature of the problem.  
                                                 
13 According to Techopedia (n.d.), “dynamic pricing is a customer or user billing mode in which the price for a 
product frequently rotates based on market demand, growth and other trends. It enables setting a cost for a 
software or Web-based product that is highly flexible in nature. Dynamic pricing is also known as real-time 
pricing.” 
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Institutional entrepreneurships pivot around modifying existing institutions. As this is 
conceptualized by the so called agency theory, the role of human activity in the construction of 
institutions is of key importance.   
Attempts were made in the study to illustrate theoretical presumptions on institutional 
entrepreneurship with examples from the sharing economy. This novel phenomenon spreading 
like wildfire probably constitutes the most significant institutional entrepreneurship existing at 
present. We tried to introduce sharing in a meticulous way, from different angles, making a clear 
distinction between pure sharing on the one hand, void of business interests and profit 
orientation, and mixed versions on the other, combining community resources with platforms 
operating on business principles.  
We also tried to answer the question whether sharing such as Uber or Airbnb established by 
institutional entrepreneurs may be regarded as a radically new phenomenon or it should be 
considered merely as a digitalized market place that technically makes the meeting of supply and 
demand easier. While this latter opinion does exist, we, however, tried to show how agents 
establishing sharing economy did not only manage to carry out technical modifications in 
transactions, but they also had a deep impact on economic relations, on the relationship to 
ownership, and on the operation of society as a whole.   
New socio-economic forms always have an antecedent, they always emerge as a result of the 
combination of already existing elements. The most important contribution of the present article 
to the research of this field is that it combines two novel topics, that of institutional 
entrepreneurship and of sharing economy, and describes the latter in several aspects as the 
combination of already known factors. Institutional entrepreneurship of mixed sharing mobilizes 
capacities that did not use to work as capital before, thus it transfers them to “quasi capital”, 
making social loss deriving from failed transactions avoidable, decreasing environmental and 
transaction costs, increasing the flexibility and growth potential of the economy.  
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